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Environmental Law: Challenge to Power Line Routing
Decision Under the Minnesota Environmental Rights
Act
In accordance with the requirements of the Power Plant Siting
Act (PPSA),' two electrical utility companies 2 applied to the Minne-
sota Environmental Quality Council (MEQC)3 for a determination of
the proper route for a new high voltage transmission line.4 The MEQC
ordered formation of a Citizens Route Evaluation Committee and
preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement for the potential
routes of the power line. The utility companies suggested five possible
routes and the Citizens Route Evaluation Committee proposed two
additional alternatives.5 At the public hearings held to discuss the
merits of the various routes,6 the utilities and People for Environmen-
tal Enlightenment and Responsibility (PEER)7 argued for the selec-
tion of Route 3, which closely paralleled an existing power line. The
MEQC power line siting staff and the Citizens Route Evaluation
Committee favored Route 7, which traversed a 130-acre virgin oak
forest near a waterfowl breeding lake.' The hearing examiner, having
1. MINN. STAT. § 116 C.51-.69 (1978) (enacted in 1973).
2. The utility companies were Northern States Power Company and Minnesota
Power and Light Company. People for Environmental Enlightenment and Responsibil-
ity (PEER), Inc. v. Minnesota Environmental Quality Council, 266 N.W.2d 858, 862
(Minn. 1978).
3. The official name of the MEQC was changed to Minnesota Environmental
Quality Board in 1975 by Act of June 2, 1975, ch. 271, § 3(7), 1975 Minn. Laws 744.
The court decided to use MEQC in its opinion-the name the body had during the
initial proceedings in the case. 266 N.W.2d at 861 n.1.
4. In July, 1975, the MEQC had issued the two utilities a certificate of corridor
compatibility, approving the general route, which was to run from Carlton County to
the Twin Cities. A February, 1976 application sought approval for the actual route
within that corridor. The transmission line in question is to make up one part of a line
extending from Manitoba to the Twin Cities, allowing power sales between Canadian
and Minnesota utilities. 266 N.W.2d at 862.
5. The seven routes were suggested for a portion of the transmission line that
crossed Washington County. The utilities' five alternatives were covered in the draft
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) prepared by the MEQC siting staff. Id.
6. Six public hearings were held between April 15, 1976 and June 23, 1976. Id.
at 863.
7. PEER is a citizens' organization that had as one of its purposes the protection
of the Washington County area from the proliferation of high voltage transmission
lines. Id. at 862.
8. The Citizens Route Evaluation Committee split its votes between Route 7 and
Route 1. Id. at 863. The proposed Route 1 paralleled a highway and an existing power
line but would have possibly crossed two public parks. Id.; Brief for Respondent
MEQC at 28-29, People for Environmental Enlightenment and Responsibility
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weighed the anticipated human and environmental effects of the two
routes as required by the PPSA,I selected Route 7, because the selec-
tion of Route 3 would have required the condemnation of more
homes. 0
When the MEQC met to consider the hearing examiner's report,
PEER alleged that Route 7 could not be selected because the Minne-
sota Environmental Rights Act (MERA)" prohibited choosing a route
that was harmful to the environment when a "prudent and feasible
alternative" was available.'2 The MEQC, however, approved the
hearing examiner's recommendation of Route 7,13 and this decision
was affirmed by the district court.'4 On appeal, the Minnesota Su-
preme Court reversed, holding that MERA applies to power line sit-
ing decisions and thus, power line routes that have a "material ad-
verse" effect on the environment cannot be selected if a "prudent and
(PEER), Inc. v. Minnesota Environmental Quality Council, 266 N.W.2d 858 (Minn.
1978).
9. In accordance with MwN. STAT. § 116C.55(1) (1978), the hearing examiner
stressed "the need to balance the interests of those directly impacted, the interest of
the body politic in the protection and preservation of the environment, . . . [and]
the efficient use of resources while ... insuring that electric energy needs are met and
fulfilled in an orderly and timely fashion." 266 N.W.2d at 863 (quoting MEQC Hearing
Examiner Report, July 12, 1976).
10. 266 N.W.2d at 869-70.
11. MINN. STAT. § 116B.01-.13 (1978) (enacted in 1971).
12. At an August 4, 1976, meeting, PEER served each member of the MEQC
with a pleading in intervention under MN. STAT. § 116B.09(1) (1978). 266 N.W.2d
at 863.
13. The MEQC vote was 7 to 3. The three members voting against the approval
of Route 7 "expressed their concern over the proliferation of routes ... and suggested
that such proliferation was inconsistent with long-term land use planning. . . ." 266
N.W.2d at 863. PEER then brought suit in the district court under a MERA provision,
MiN. STAT. § 116B.09(3) (1978), allowing appeal of an agency decision that affects
the environment. PEER also sought review under MmN. STAT. § 116C.65 (1978), the
PPSA's appeal provision. See 266 N.W.2d at 863.
14. District Court Judge Thomas Forsberg held:
(1) That substantial evidence supported the selection of Route 7 over
Route 3 and Route 1;
(2) That the effect of the [transmission line] on human settlement
was not an improper criterion and was not overly weighted;
(3) That the findings of fact were sufficiently specific to permit judicial
review;
(4) That the alleged procedural errors were either not demonstrated or
not prejudicial;
(5) That it was unnecessary to inquire into the individual mental pro-
cesses of the members of the MEQC; and
(6) That the balancing of social policies required by the PPSA was
consistent with both MERA and the Environmental Policy Act (MEPA),
[MmnN. STAT. §§ 116D.01-.07].
266 N.W.2d at 863-64.
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feasible alternative" is available. It further held that an alternative
that avoids new incursions of human activity into the natural envi-
ronment can be prudent and feasible even if it harms developed
property. 5 People for Environmental Enlightenment and Responsi-
bility (PEER), Inc. v. Minnesota Environmental Quality Council,
266 N.W.2d 858, 864 (Minn. 1978).
Prior to the adoption of MERA and other state environmental
legislation, governmental agencies and utility companies in Minne-
sota were permitted to exercise the right of eminent domain with
little regard for the environmental effects of their actions. 6 Like de-
veloped property, land in its natural state could be condemned so
long as it was "reasonably necessary" to further a proper public pur-
pose." Under this standard, highways and power lines were routinely
constructed despite damage to valuable natural resources. Because
the common law afforded little or no basis for challenging condemna-
tions on environmental grounds, 8 judicial review of such decisions
15. The court also held that Route 3 was a prudent and feasible alternative to
Route 7 and thus should have been chosen as a matter of law. The court remanded
the case, however, to allow Route 3 residents to present further evidence to the MEQC
to aid its determination of whether Route 3 was an appropriate choice under the
guidelines set forth in PEER. 266 N.W.2d at 864. See notes 69-70 and accompanying
text infra. On remand, the MEQC selected Route 7. 3 EQB MONTOR 49 (1978); St.
Paul Pioneer Press, Oct. 14, 1978, at 15, col. 1.
In addition to the environmental issues, the PEER decision establishes an impor-
tant administrative law precedent. The court held that the legislature "clearly in-
tended agency members to read the material presented to it [sic] prior to reaching
their decision," 266 N.W.2d at 873, reasoning that "[u]nder the [Minnesota Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (MAPA)] the agency must review the evidence and findings
amassed by a hearing examiner and come to an independent decision." Id.
Taken literally, the court appears to have interpreted MAPA to require that
agency heads read all the materials that concern a particular decision. This require-
ment, of course, would place a tremendous burden on the administrative decision-
maker. Given the voluminous nature of administrative records, this burden makes the
administrator's role impracticable. For a thorough discussion of the disturbing preced-
ent that PEER may have set, see Auerbach, Administrative Rulemaking in Minnesota,
63 MINN. L. REv. 151, 190-96 (1979).
16. The power to grant the right of eminent domain to a governmental body or
company lies solely with the legislature. See, e.g., Kelmar Corp. v. District Court, 269
Minn. 137, 142, 130 N.W.2d 228, 232 (1964) ("ordinarily true that the power of eminent
domain can be exercised only as authorized by the legislature").
17. See Bryden, Environmental Rights in Theory and Practice, 62 MINN. L. Rnv.
163, 203 (1978).
18. Until the late 1960's, when a significant number of citizens became concerned
about environmental protection, condemnation law in the United States reflected the
traditional American belief that natural resources should be freely available for
use-or misuse. See, e.g., N. WENGERT, NATURAL REsoucRcEs AND TiEPoLcAL
STRUGoL 17 (1955) (describing this early thought as "a trust that everything will come
out all right, that particular resources are limitless. . . ."). The New Jersey Supreme
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was rarely sought.'9 In practice, roads and power lines were generally
routed through natural areas because the cost was less than that of a
route through a developed community."
In response to the lack of common law remedies available to
prevent environmental degradation, the Minnesota legislature en-
acted MERA in 1971.1 MERA allows any citizen to seek judicial
review of conduct that "materially adversely affects or is likely to
materially adversely affect the environment."" Once a prima facie
case of environmental harm is established in such a suit,2 the Act
Court, for example, allowed a gas pipeline to cross an area specifically set aside for
wildlife preservation, even though a slightly more expensive alternative route was
available. The court required only that the choice not be "arbitrary and capricious."
Texas East. Trans. Corp. v. Wildlife Preserves, Inc., 49 N.J. 405, 230 A.2d 505 (1967).
19. Cf. Bryden, supra note 17, at 164-67 (limitations on the use of common law
causes of acton for environmental challenges). The standard for the scope of judicial
review in condemnation proceedings was that "[c]ourts may interfere only when the
. actions are manifestly arbitrary or unreasonable." Housing and Redevelopment
Auth. v. Minneapolis Metropolitan Co., 259 Minn. 1, 15, 104 N.W.2d 864, 874 (1960).
The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected only one proposed power line condemna-
tion because of environmental concerns. In Minnesota Power and Light Co. v. State,
177 Minn. 343, 225 N.W. 164 (1929), the court held that a power line could not be
routed through Jay Cooke State Park. The court relied on the "public use" exception
to the right of eminent domain, reasoning that the condemnors could not take land
dedicated to a public use that was inconsistent with the condemnors' proposed use.
The court stated that, "it seems reasonably clear that the line is inconsistent with the
purpose of maintaining the land as a park .... Id. at 350-51, 225 N.W. at 167. But
see State v. Christopher, 284 Minn. 233, 170 N.W. 2d 95 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1011 (1970) (Minnesota State Highway Commissioner's decision to condemn twenty-
three acres of Minnehaha Park in Minneapolis upheld despite availability of alterna-
tive route requiring condemnation of only three acres of parkland).
20. See note 46 infra.
21. MINN. STAT. § 116B.03(1) (1978). MERA's statement of purpose provides
that
[t]he legislature finds and declares that each person is entitled by right
to the protection, preservation, and enhancement of air, water, land, and
other natural resources located within the state and that each person has the
responsibility to contribute to the protection, preservation, and enhance-
ment thereof . . . . Accordingly, it is in the public interest to provide an
adequate civil remedy to protect . . [such] resources located within the
state from pollution, impairment, or destruction.
Id. at § 116B.01.
22. MN. STAT. § 116B.02(5) (1978) (defining "pollution, impairment or destruc-
tion" conduct). MERA authorizes civil actions "for the protection of the air, water,
land, or other natural resources located, within the state. . . from pollution, impair-
ment, or destruction . . . ." Id. at § 116B.03(1).
23. A prima facie case is established under MERA when the court finds "(1) [a]
protectable natural resource, and (2) pollution, impairment, or destruction of the
resource." County of Freeborn v. Bryson, 297 Minn. 218, 228, 210 N.W.2d 290, 297
(1973). Protectable natural resources "shall include but not be limited to, all mineral,
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provides that
the defendant may rebut the prima facie showing by the submission
of evidence to the contrary. The defendant may also show, by way
of an affirmative defense, that there is no feasible and prudent
alternative and the conduct at issue is consistent with and reasona-
bly required for promotion of the public health, safety, and welfare
in light of the state's paramount concern for the protection of its air,
water, land and other natural resources from pollution, impairment,
or destruction. Economic considerations alone shall not constitute
a defense hereunder.2 4
By authorizing citizen suits to challenge actions that may have ad-
verse environmental effects, MERA significantly altered the tradi-
tional law of eminent domain in Minnesota.n
Concern fdr Minnesota's natural environment was also one of the
factors that led to the enactment of the PPSA in 1973. The basic
purpose of the PPSA is to provide a centralized decision making
process for the siting of power plants and transmission lines.2 The
animal, botanical, air, water, land, timber, soil, quietude, recreational, and historical
resources." MINN. STAT. § 116B.02(4) (1978).
24. MINN. STAT. § 116B.04 (1978) (emphasis added). The "feasible and prudent
alternative" standard also appears in the Department of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C.
§ 1653(f) (1976) and the Federal-Aid Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1976), two statutes
designed to protect parkIands from highway construction. The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit has defined that standard in the following manner: "A feasible alterna-
tive route is one that is compatible with sound engineering ... and a prudent alterna-
tive route is one that does not present unique problems, that is, an alternative without
truly unusual factors so that the cost or community disruption would reach extraordi-
nary magnitudes . . . ." Monroe County Conservation Council, Inc., v. Volpe, 472
F.2d 693, 700 (2d Cir. 1972) (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402, 411, 412-13 (1971)). This standard must be applied when federal agencies
submit impact standards as required by the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 433z(2)(C) (1976). See Monroe County Conservation Council,
Inc., v. Volpe, 472 F.2d at 700 & n.6.
25. See County of Freeborn v. Bryson, 309 Minn. 178, 188, 243 N.W.2d 316, 321
(1976) ("Until [MERA] was passed, the holder of the power of eminent domain had
in its hands almost a legislative fiat to construct a highway wherever it wished ....
The remaining resources will not be destroyed so indiscriminately because the law has
been drastically changed by the Act"); Bryden, supra note 17, at 176 ("[MERA] frees
the courts from most of the common law restraints, enabling them to articulate and
enforce a public right to environmental quality.").
26. See No Power Line, Inc. v. Minnesota Environmental Quality Council, 262
N.W.2d 312 (Minn. 1977):
Prior to May 24, 1973, the effective date of the Power Plant Siting Act
(PPSA), the location and construction of electrical transmission lines were
not regulated on a statewide basis. Instead, a public utility that wished to
construct a power line had to secure permits from the local authorities of the
counties and municipalities through which it proposed to locate its facilities.
In an attempt to ensure that future development of power generating plants
1979]
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Act requires the MEQC to choose sites and routes that "minimize
adverse human and environmental impact while insuring continuing
electric power system reliability and integrity . . . ."I Apart from
this general balancing test, the PPSA sets forth a number of more
specific criteria that the MEQC is required to consider when making
power line siting decisions.2 After the MEQC has made a decision
based on these factors, the Act grants "[a]ny utility, party, or person
aggrieved by the issuance of a . . .transmission line construction
permit" the right to appeal the decision to a district court.2
PEER is the first case in which the Minnesota Supreme Court
has considered the relationship of MERA to the PPSA. The MEQC
argued that MERA should not apply to power line siting decisions.
Since "the purpose of [MERA] is not to supplant specific environ-
mental review processes, but to bring environmental considerations
into administrative decision making where there is otherwise a
void,"3 and PPSA requires the MEQC to consider the environmental
effects of alternative power line routes, the MEQC argued, MERA
should have no application to power line routing decisions. 3'
The PEER court rejected this argument and held that a power
line routing decision can be the subject of a lawsuit brought under
MERA by the MEQC.32 The court based this conclusion on three
reasons. First, that the purpose of the PPSA was not to supersede
MERA but rather to complement it by establishing a "coherent
legislative policy" 3 designed "to harmonize the need for electric
and high-voltage transmission lines in the state would proceed in an orderly
and rational fashion . . the legislature passed the PPSA.
Id. at 317 (footnotes omitted).
By enacting the PPSA, the legislature sought to ensure that the future
siting of power plants and transmission lines would be carried out in an
orderly fashion. . . rather than haphazardly, and possibly unnecessarily, at
the whim of individual public utilities whose decisions might fail to consider
or comport with the public interest.
Id. at 321 (footnotes omitted).
27. MWNN. STAT. § 116C.53(1) (1978).
28. These criteria require the MEQC to examine a number of considerations
before approving a transmission line route. Included in these criteria are the route's
effect on human health, natural resources, agricultural lands, and future development,
and the potential for transmission line proliferation. MINN. STAT. § 116C.57(4) (1978).
29. Id. at § 116C.65.
30. Brief of Respondent MEQC at 17, People for Environmental Enlightenment
and Responsibility (PEER), Inc. v. Minnesota Environmental Quality Council, 266
N.W.2d 858 (Minn. 1978).
31. See 266 N.W.2d at 866 & n.8.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 865. The court decided that MERA and the PPSA, coupled with the
Minnesota Environmental Policy Act, MINN. STAT. § 116D.01-.07 (1978), form a coher-
ent environmental policy. 266 N.W.2d at 865.
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power with the equally important goal of environmental protec-
tion." u In the court's view, the PPSA was enacted to ensure that the
siting of power lines is administered by the "environmentally skilled
personnel" of MEQC, and MERA exists in part to permit private
lawsuits if the MEQC does not give sufficient weight to environmen-
tal harm in its power line routing decisions." Second, the court rea-
soned that since the PPSA was enacted subsequent to MERA, the
legislature could have specifically provided that the MERA standard
did not apply to PPSA deliberations. Based on the presumption that
the legislature "acted with full knowledge of prior legislation on the
same subject,"" the court found that the PPSA did not limit MERA.
Finally, the court noted that "a statute adopted from another state
. . . is presumed to have been taken with the construction there
placed upon it."" MERA is modeled after the Michigan Environmen-
tal Protection Act" and since the Michigan courts had applied that
statute to all agency decisions in that state, the court concluded that
the Minnesota Act should have a similarly broad application."
Having found MERA applicable to power line routing decisions,
the court then examined the substantive standard of review applica-
ble to a suit brought under MERA. The court determined that
MERA's "prudent and feasible alternative standard is analogous to
the principle of nonproliferation in land use planning."40 The non-
34. 266 N.W.2d at 865.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 866 (citations omitted). The court also stated that "the general policy
of statutory construction followed by this court [is to] harmoniz[e] statutes dealing
with the same subject matter." Id. (citations omitted).
37. 266 N.W.2d at 866 & n.6 (citations omitted).
38. MICH. Coup. LAws ANN. § 691.1201-.1207 (West Supp. 1977).
39. 266 N.W.2d at 866 nn.6, 7. The court also noted that MERA's broad grant
of standing evidenced a legislative intent to have MERA apply in all situations. Id. at
866. MERA allows "any natural person" and almost any organization to seek judicial
review. MINN. STAT. § 116B.09(1) (1978). The PPSA, on the other hand, limits review
to "[a]ny utility, party or person aggrieved by the issuance of a ... transmission line
construction permit . . . ." Id. at § 116C.65 (1978).
Noting the broad scope of MERA's grant of standing, the PEER court stated:
The encouragement of citizen suits to protect the environment from impair-
ment or pollution reflects the legislature's conviction that while individuals
will be vigilant in their attempts to prevent the destruction of their homes
and private property, since the environment belongs to no one, no one will
protect it unless private attorneys-general are permitted to sue on behalf of
the public interest.
266 N.W.2d at 869 n.16.
40. 266 N.W.2d at 868. The court found support for its analogy in recent legisla-
tive and administrative actions dealing with the siting of high voltage transmission
lines. In the 1977 amendments to the PPSA, the legislature ordered the MEQC to
consider existing rights-of-way along highways and railroads and ordered studies of the
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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
proliferation principle in land use planning requires that no new con-
struction take place on land in its natural state if the same project
could be undertaken on developed property." According to the court,
both the principle of nonproliferation and the "prudent and feasible
alternative" standard seek to prevent future impairment of natural
resources.42 Thus, the court concluded "that in order to make the
[power line] route selection process comport with Minnesota's com-
mitment to the principle of nonproliferation, the MEQC must, as a
matter of law, choose a pre-existing route unless there are extremely
strong reasons not to do so.""
The court then enunciated what appears to be an alternative
construction of MERA's prudent and feasible alternative standard.
First, the court recognized the distinction between compensable and
noncompensable harm. Harm to developed property is considered
compensable since its owners can usually be adequately reimbursed
financially. On the other hand, "[tihe destruction of protectible
environmental resources. . is non-compensable and injurious to all
present and future residents . . . ."" Because the value of undevel-
oped property cannot be accurately expressed in terms of market
feasibility of multiple circuiting so that a number of lines could be accommodated on
a single set of towers. Act of June 2, 1977, ch. 439, § 10, 1977 Minn. Laws 1192-93. See
note 8 supra. MEQC regulations on power line routing that were in effect at the time
of the PEER decision described the use of existing and proposed rights-of-way as
"preferred." Minn. Reg. MEQC 74(d)(3)(ee) (1977), as amended by 6 MCAR 3.073(H)
(1978).
41. 266 N.W.2d at 868. The court relied on Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst, 256
N.W.2d 808 (Minn. 1977), in determining that the principle of nonproliferation guides
Minnesota land use planning. 266 N.W.2d at 868. In Reserve, the Minnesota Supreme
Court found that the principles of nonproliferation and consolidated land uses required
that the Mile Post 7 taconite tailings disposal site, which was closer to the mining
company's plant and other human developments, be chosen over the Mile Post 20 site,
which was completely within a national forest. 256 N.W.2d at 832-33. The Reserve
court was not persuaded by the state's contention that a greater human health hazard
was presented by disposal at Mile Post 7. The court characterized the scientific evi-
dence as too ambiguous to base a decision on, concluding that "no risk has been proved
by substantial evidence," id. at 840, and therefore intrusion into the Mile Post 20
area-being natural and recreational in character-was not justified. Id. at 841.
42. 266 N.W.2d at 868.
43. Id. The court explained that it reached
this conclusion partly because the utilization of a pre-existing route mini-
mizes the impact of the new intrusion by limiting its effects to those who are
already accustomed to living with an existing route. More importantly, how-
ever, the establishment of a new route today means that in the future, when
the principle of nonproliferation is properly applied, residents living along
this newly established route may have to suffer the burden of additional
powerline easements.
44. Id. at 869.
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price, balancing the financial costs of alternatives would invariably
lead to decisions having an adverse effect on the environment. The
court concluded, therefore, that the prudent and feasible alternative
standard generally prohibits attempts to balance, in monetary terms,
alternative courses of development when one alternative requires con-
demnation of developed property and the other destruction of the
natural environment. 5 An environmentally destructive action must
be rejected unless the alternatives would cause "extraordinary dis-
ruption:"" Although the court did not define what it meant by this
exception, it stated that "the taking of seven or eight homes is not
extraordinary disruption." 7
Having concluded that the balancing of noncompensable harm
to the environment against compensable harm to developed property
was impermissible under MERA, the court attempted to reconcile
this interpretation of the prudent and feasible alternative standard
with the explicit wording of the PPSA requiring the MEQC to take
both "human" and "environmental" impacts into account when
making power line routing decisions." The court resolved this appar-
ent contradiction by reasoning that the "human impact" referred to
in the PPSA must have been intended by the legislature to encom-
pass only "noncompensable impairment of human resources.""
Hence, in the court's view, a balancing of human and environmental
impacts under the PPSA was permissible only in circumstances in
which an owner of developed property demonstrates "unique irre-
placeable characteristics . . .not reflected in market value" that
would make the condemnation of the property noncompensableY°
Of all aspects of the court's reasoning in PEER, this attempt to
reconcile the "human impact" language of the PPSA with the pru-
dent and feasible alternative standard of MERA is the least convinc-
ing. The court's interpretation of the MEQC's duty to minimize the
human impact of power line routing decisions is anomalous, because
the language of the PPSA contains no suggestion that the legislature
intended that only "noncompensable" harm to developed property
45. Id.
46. Id. at 870. The court stated that any other result would be contrary to.Citi-
zens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) which interpreted
the prudent and feasible alternative standard of two federal statutes as prohibiting any
wide ranging balancing of compensable and noncompensable harms. The Supreme
Court in Volpe reasoned that if such balancing were allowed, environmentally damag-
ing routes would normally be chosen because construction costs are usually lower on
undeveloped land. Id. at 411-12. See note 24 supra.
47. 266 N.W.2d at 870. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
48. MN. STAT. § 116C.53(1) (1978).
49. 266 N.W.2d at 870.
50. Id.
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was to be taken into account. The Act does not in any way qualify
the nature of the adverse human impacts that must be considered by
the MEQC in making its routing determinations.' Moreover, the
legislative history of the PPSA suggests that the Act was adopted to
protect all property owners from the haphazard siting of power
lines-not just those owning homes or other structures with "unique
irreplaceable characteristics." 2 Thus, a reasonable reading of the
PPSA is that it requires the MEQC to balance environmental harm
against damage to all types of developed property when making
power line siting decisions.
The court's refusal to accept this straightforward interpretation
of the PPSA's "human impact" language suggests either that the
court was mistaken in concluding that MERA and the PPSA can be
consistently applied to power line siting decisions or that the court
incorrectly interpreted MERA's prudent and feasible alternative
standard. On the one hand, if the court was correct in holding that a
balancing of environmental damage with compensable harm to devel-
oped property is impermissible under MERA, the PPSA and MERA
appear to impose different standards for determining the proper
routes for power lines. This conclusion seems to undercut the court's
initial determination that the legislature did not intend the PPSA to
supersede MERA with respect to power line routing decisions. On the
other hand, if it is assumed that the two statutes were both intended
to apply to power line siting decisions, the court's conclusion that
MERA's prudent and feasible alternative standard does not permit
the type of balancing contemplated by the PPSA appears to be mis-
taken.
From the standpoint of general statutory construction and pol-
icy, however, the two conclusions of the court appear correct. First,
the conclusion that a power line routing decison by the MEQC can
be the subject of a MERA suit is supported by the general purposes
of MERA. Few decisions made by state agencies affect the environ-
ment as directly as power line routing determinations by the
MEQC. 13 If citizens other than those directly affected were denied the
right to challenge such decisions, 4 MERA's purpose of providing
51. See MINN. STAT. § 116C.53(1) (1978).
52. See note 26 supra.
53. For example, the transmission line route involved in the PEER case required
that a 150-foot wide corridor be created through a virgin oak forest. Brief of Appellants
at 6, People For Environmental Enlightenment and Responsibility (PEER), Inc. v.
Minnesota Environmental Quality Council, 266 N.W.2d 858 (Minn. 1978).
54. Min. STAT. § 116C.65 (1978) limits standing to challenge the MEQC's deci-
sions under the PPSA to "[a]ny utility, party, or person aggrieved. . . ." This could
easily be interpreted to allow appeal of MEQC decisions only by those directly affected
by property loss or destruction. See note 39 supra.
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standing for citizen suits whenever an agency takes an action that
adversely affects the environment 5  would be severely undermined.
Moreover, there is nothing in the language or underlying purpose of
the PPSA that is inconsistent with allowing any interested citizen to
bring a MERA suit to appeal a MEQC power line routing decision.
Although the PPSA invests the MEQC with the power to determine
power line routes, it does not provide that such decisions are to be
considered final and therefore not subject to appeal under MERA. 6
Second, the court's conclusion that MERA's prudent and feasi-
ble alternative standard does not permit a traditional monetary bal-
ancing of the costs of condemning developed property against those
of taking undeveloped land is consistent with the legislative purpose
of MERA. 5 MERA was adopted in large part because such a balanc-
ing test often led to destruction of the environment since this result
was usually less expensive than the alternative of compensating own-
ers of developed property.58 If the court had held that a monetary
balancing test was consistent with MERA, the result would have
marked a return to the pre-MERA law5 that enabled "environmental
considerations to be balanced out of the equation entirely.""0 The
court's opinion thus has the virtue of rejecting the traditional balanc-
ing test as the interpretation of MERA's prudent and feasible alter-
native standard, while permitting a MERA suit to contest a power
line routing decision.
The weakness of the court's opinion is that it unnecessarily and
unsuccessfully attempts to reconcile the MERA standard with the
PPSA's requirement that the MEQC consider human as well as envi-
ronmental impacts when making power line routing decisions. The
strained analysis was not necessary because, despite the fact that
MERA and the PPSA seem to contemplate two different standards
for judging the soundness of a power line siting decision, the two
statutes are not necessarily inconsistent. The standards they enunci-
ate are directed to two bodies serving different functions. Under the
PPSA, the MEQC is required to consider many factors and then
ultimately determine routes for power lines in a manner that
"minimize[s] adverse human and environmental impact
55. See note 39 supra.
56. See MiNN. STAT. § 116C.57 (1978).
57. In fact, a provision of MERA not cited by the court states that "[elconomic
considerations alone shall not constitute a defense [to a MERA suit]." Id. at §
116B.04.
58. See note 46 supra.
59. See notes 21-25 supra.
60. 266 N.W.2d at 869.
61. MINN. STAT. § 116C.53(1) (1978).
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Once such a determination by the MEQC is challenged by a MERA
suit, however, the decision must be reviewed by a district court under
MERA's prudent and feasible alternative standard. The court is re-
quired to scrutinize the environmental effects of the decision even
more closely than the MEQC and determine whether there exists a
prudent and feasible alternative to a selected route that would cause
environmental harm." If the court had recognized the different func-
tions of MERA and the PPSA, it could have held that a power line
routing decision may be challenged by a MERA suit despite the fact
that the MEQC's decision may be based on criteria different than
those considered by the court reviewing the decision under MERA.
It might be argued, however, that it would be undesirable to have
the MEQC spend considerable time and resources determining the
proper route for a power line under the PPSA standard, only to have
its decision overturned when the case was reviewed under the stricter
standard of MERA. While such an argument has force, it can hardly
justify the strained manner in which the court in PEER interpreted
the PPSA's language requiring the MEQC to take human impact into
account in its power line siting decisions. It seems quite probable that
the legislature did not consider the interaction between MERA and
the PPSA when the latter statute was passed. " Although statutory
interpretation is an important aspect of judicial decisionmaking, the
court's problematical treatment of MERA and the PPSAII indicates
that, in this instance, the task of reconciliation may have been more
appropriate for the legislature than the court.
Whatever the merits of the reasoning that led the court to con-
clude that power line routing decisions may be challenged by MERA
suits, the PEER decision is significant in that it indicates that actions
by state agencies that adversely affect the environment can be sub-
ject to a MERA suit. Ultimately, however, the true importance of the
PEER opinion will probably lie in the court's interpretation of
MERA's prudent and feasible alternative standard. PEER is the first
case in which the Minnesota Supreme Court has discussed this stan-
dard in depth. 5 Obviously, a judicial explanation of the prudent and
62. Id. at § 116B.03-.04.
63. Under these circumstances, the tenet of statutory construction that the legis-
lature, in enacting a statute, "acted with full knowledge of prior legislation on the same
subject," 266 N.W.2d 866, would appear to be unrealistic.
64. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
65. The court was able to decide prior MERA cases, without significant explica-
tion of the prudent and feasible alternative standard. See, e.g., Minnesota Pub. Inter-
est Research Group v. White Bear Rod & Gun Club, 257 N.W.2d 762 (Minn. 1977);
Corwine v. Crow Wing County, 309 Minn. 345, 244 N.W.2d 482 (1976); County of
Freeborn v. Bryson, 309 Minn. 178, 243 N.W.2d 316 (1976); County of Freeborn v.
Bryson, 297 Minn. 218, 210 N.W.2d 290 (1973).
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feasible alternative standard is desirable from the standpoint of giv-
ing state agencies and private parties a clearer understanding of what
type of action is prohibited under MERA. As one comentator has
argued, "[m]ost likely, appellate decisions in MERA suits will be
more influential than the bare statute because their commands are
more definite.""6 To some extent at least, the PEER opinion may be
judged on the basis of whether it provides a more definite interpreta-
tion of the statute.
In an attempt to elucidate MERA's prudent and feasible alterna-
tive standard, the court first stated that the standard "is analogous
to the principle of nonproliferation in land use planning.""7 In cases
such as PEER, where a new road or power line may be routed through
or alongside a pre-existing corridor, the "nonproliferation" principle
is easily applied. In most cases, however, it appears doubtful that the
concept of nonproliferation will provide useful guidance to lower
courts or deter actions destructive to the environment. Taken liter-
ally, the nonproliferation principle would prohibit all further en-
croachments on the natural environment. Since this would result in
a virtual halt to all new construction in the state, it is clear that the
court did not intend such a meaning. Rather, the court stated that
further proliferation is to be prohibited unless there are "extremely
strong reasons not to do so."8 This interpretation offers little insight
into the MERA standard, however. Indeed, the court's nonprolifera-
tion principle offers no more concrete guidance than the bare statu-
tory language of MERA, which prohibits environmentally harmful
actions when there is a prudent and feasible alternative.
The critical question under MERA is when an alternative to an
action causing damage to the environment is to be considered pru-
dent and feasible. The court in PEER attempted to deal with this
question by distinguishing the noncompensable nature of harm to the
environment from the generally compensable nature of condemna-
tions of developed property."0 In general, the court concluded, an
alternative to action that would cause environmental harm should be
considered prudent and feasible unless the alternative results in non-
compensable harm to developed property. 0
66. Bryden, supra note 17, at 220.
67. 266 N.W.2d at 868.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 869. See text accompanying notes 49-50 supra.
70. Id. at 869-70. The court decided that the taking of a home would be noncom-
pensable if the home contained features that could not be reflected in market value
such as being "crafted in an unusual manner or constructed of rare materials. ...
Similarly, the establishment of some noncorporeal aspect of home ownership, such as
proximity to a unique school system which could not be reproduced or converted to
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The court's distinction between compensable and noncompensa-
ble harm seems overly simplistic. While it may be readily conceded
that no monetary value can be placed on the natural environment, it
may also be argued that few homeowners receive full compensation
when their homes are condemned. The court's conclusion to the con-
trary ignores important subjective values associated with the reten-
tion of one's home and the difficulty of ascertaining the monetary
equivalent of such values. 7
1
Nevertheless, it seems clear that few homeowners, if any, could
protect their houses from condemnation under the PEER require-
ment that the home be "unique [and] irreplaceable. 72 Thus, al-
though the court's reasoning may oversimplify the value conflicts
that arise in most MERA suits, its conclusion that the preservation
of the natural environment cannot depend on a balancing of eco-
nomic factors seems inescapable.13 Realistically, however, the pros-
pect of having to condemn large amounts of developed property will
at some point force courts to permit environmental harm even under
the MERA standard. Recognizing this, the court in PEER concluded
that an alternative to environmental destruction would not be pru-
dent and feasible if it resulted in "truly extraordinary disruption.""4
Precisely what the court envisioned by this standard is unclear, but
its conclusion that the taking of seven or eight homes is not an ex-
traordinary disruption 75 suggests that further impositions on Minne-
market value, could make the owner's interest in the property noncompensable." Id.
at 870.
The PEER court made it nearly impossible to show that the taking of any house
is noncompensable. The market value of homes generally reflects rare materials used
or unique design employed.
71. Freeman, Give and Take: Distributing Local Environmental Control
Through Land-Use Regulation, 60 MN. L. REV. 883 (1976). In examining the defer-
ence of some courts to homeowners in nuisance cases, Professor Freeman observed that
these courts recognize the "important subjective values associated with residential
amenity-values whose monetary equivalents may be difficult or impossible to ascer-
tain." Id. at 920 (footnote omitted).
72. See 266 N.W.2d at 870.
73. See text accompanying note 24 supra; note 57 supra and accompanying text.
74. 266 N.W.2d at 870.
75. Id. Despite the court's holding that MERA does not allow the balancing of
human and environmental harms on an economic basis, the "extraordinary disrup-
tion" standard may introduce an element of balancing into the court's scheme. When
the potential environmental impact is slight, courts would be more likely to find that
the harm to compensable property constitutes extraordinary disruption. On the other
hand, where the potential environmental harm is substantial, it would be more diffi-
cult to show extraordinary disruption. It is clear, of course, that in any case an extraor-
dinary disruption would not be found unless there is an extreme disparity between the
harm to the compensable property and the harm to the environment.
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sota's natural environment will be allowed only in very rare circum-
stances.
Although the "extraordinary disruption" standard is somewhat
nebulous, it is more definite than the bare statutory language and
thus may deter some private parties and state agencies from taking
actions that have environmentally destructive effects. Certainly
PEER should have an important impact with respect to future power
line routing decisions made by the MEQC. Whether or not the PEER
decision will deter other state agencies and private citizens from tak-
ing actions that have adverse environmental consequences is more
difficult to predict." After PEER, however, it seems likely that both
private and public condemnors will be required to give greater consid-
eration to the environmental results of their actions.
Whatever the deterrent effect of an opinion such as PEER, the
case may be regarded as the foremost example to date of MERA's
efficacy in preventing environmental harm on a case-by-case basis.
While the PEER opinion is consistent with the relatively small num-
ber of MERA cases decided by the Minnesota Supreme Court,7
PEER gives the most expansive interpretation of the environmental
protections afforded by MERA.18 Obviously, the PEER decision
makes a strong statement in favor of environmental protection and
76. Professor Bryden, in his study of the results of MERA litigation prior to
PEER, noted that
the deterrent effect of MERA probably differs among various classes of ac-
tors. Almost certainly, some types of people-farmers for instance-often
make "environmental decisions" either without consulting an attorney, or
after consulting one who takes account only of more specific and familiar
regulations such as the local zoning ordinance. Industries that have obtained
the necessary permits from local and state agencies and that have a strong
financial incentive to choose a course of action that is relatively insensitive
to environmental quality may also pay little attention to [MERA]. Even
those civil servants whose mission is to protect the environment and who
might interpret the Act as authority for standing firm in some circumstances
where they would otherwise be dubious about their legal right to do so are
affected by so many other scientific, administrative, political, and legal con-
straints that one wonders whether more than a minute fraction of adminis-
trative decisions with environmental impacts can accurately be attributed
to [MERA].
Bryden, supra note 17, at 219-20. (footnotes omitted).
77. See id. at 214 n.367; cases cited in note 65 supra.
78. Prior to PEER, the Minnesota Supreme Court's most significant decision
interpreting MERA's "prudent and feasible alternative" standard was County of Free-
born v. Bryson, 309 Minn. 178, 243 N.W.2d 316 (1976). In that case, the court ordered
that one acre of farmland be condemned to protect a marsh from the route of a
highway. Id. at 187, 243 N.W.2d at 321. PEER's condemnation of a number of dwell-
ings to protect an oak forest is a much stronger precedent in favor of natural resource
preservation.
19791
722 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:707
represents a significant departure from the traditional view that con-
demnation of undeveloped land should be favored over the taking of
developed property.
